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Abstract
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to leave Russia and
other Eastern European countries with market power in the market
for emission permits. Ceteris paribus, this will raise the permit price
above the competitive permit price. However, Russia is also a large
exporter of fossil fuels. A high price on emission permits may lower
the producer price on fossil fuels. Thus, if Russia coordinates its
permit market and fossil fuel market policies, market power will not
necessarily lead to a higher permit price.
Fossil fuel producers may also exert market power in the permit
market, provided they conceive the permit price to be influenced by
their production volumes. If higher volumes drive up the permit price,
Russian fuel producers may become more aggressive relative to their
competitors in the fuel markets if the sale of fuels is coordinated with
the sale of permits. The result is reversed if high fuel production drives
the permit price down.
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1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol requires that the average annual emissions of a basket
of six greenhouse gases in the industrialized countries do not exceed 95 per
cent of 1990 emissions in the period 2008-2012. The United States have
withdrawn from the agreement. Nevertheless, it is likely that a suﬃcient
number of countries will ratify the agreement, so that it may enter into
force.1 This paper takes as its starting point that the Kyoto Protocol (or a
similar climate agreement) will be implemented.
Parties of the Kyoto Protocol are allowed to engage in international emis-
sion trading. Some countries may become large traders and thus be in a
position to exercise market power in the permit market. As pointed out by
Hahn (1984), the degree of market power in the permit market depends on
the initial allocation of permits. The literature on the economic impact of
the Kyoto Protocol suggests that Russia and other Eastern European coun-
tries will become large exporters of permits (see Weyant and Hill (1999) and
Weyant (1999)). Although the US withdrawal from the agreement will re-
duce the demand for permits, Russia and other Eastern European countries
will still have a large share of the permit supply as their initial allocation of
permits is expected to exceed their business as usual emissions. It is there-
fore quite likely that these countries will be able to exercise some monopoly
power in the market for emission permits. A recent quantitative analysis
by Bo¨hringer (2002) concludes that the region ”Former Soviet Union” can
significantly increase its benefit of the agreement by restricting its supply of
permits.
Utilizing the market power in the permit market will increase the permit
price. A high price on emission permits, however, may reduce the demand
for fossil fuels. Hence, it is not obvious that a fossil fuel exporting country
will benefit from utilizing its market power in the permit market. In this
paper, we explore the conditions under which it is profitable for a permit
exporting country to utilize its market power to drive up the permit price
and when it is profitable to keep the permit price low.
The presence of market power on the producer side of the fossil fuel mar-
kets adds an extra dimension to our analysis, because the fuel producers
may be able to utilize their market power to influence the price of emission
permits. In other words, oligopolistic fuel producers may have market power
in the permit market as well. This requires, of course, that the combustion
of fuels in the relevant fuel markets constitutes a significant part of the to-
1The agreement will not enter into force, until it has been ratified by at least 55 countries
which together contribute to at least 55 percent of the industrialized world’s greenhouse
gas emissions in 1990.
2
tal emissions by the countries participating in permit trade. A country like
Russia, which is a large oil and gas producer, may therefore be able to in-
fluence the price of emission permits not only directly through the supply of
permits, but also indirectly through its role as a large oil and gas producer.
Russia enjoys a market share of 42% in the European gas market and 10%
in the global oil market (IEA (2001a), IEA (2001b)). Moreover, based on
projections by the International Energy Agency, we have calculated that the
combustion of gas in the European gas market will cause around 20% of total
greenhouse gas emissions in all industrialised countries in 2010, excluding the
USA. The corresponding figure for the global oil market is 33% (IEA, 2000).
Hence, it is not unlikely that Russian gas and oil producers may be able to
exercise some market power in the permit market.
This paper explores the consequences for the permit and fossil fuel mar-
kets of market power in the permit market, taking into account the fact that
market power in the permit market can be exercised both directly through
the supply of permits and indirectly through the supply of fossil fuels. Fur-
thermore, we show how the potential coordination of supply decisions for
fossil fuels and emission permits might influence the equilibrium both in the
permit market and in the fossil fuel markets. Finally, we discuss the desir-
ability of coordinating the supply of emission permits and the supply of fossil
fuels.
The interaction of permit markets with product markets with imperfect
competition has been analyzed in several studies. Misiolek and Elder (1989)
analyze a product market with a dominant firm facing a fringe of price takers
and show that the dominant firm may buy permits in order to raise the cost
of rivals in the same industry or to block entry of new competitors. In a
similar vein, von der Fehr (1993) shows that emission permits can be used
strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes.
Borenstein (1988), Malueg (1990) and Sartzetakis (1997) consider the welfare
eﬀect of a competitive permit market in the presence of imperfect product
markets, showing that although a competitive permit market will ensure
cost eﬃcient abatement eﬀorts, it may lead to ineﬃciencies in production
decisions when the output market is oligopolisitc.
In previous studies, emissions are assumed to arise in the production
process. In our analysis, emissions are caused by the combustion of fossil
fuels, i.e., on the consumer side. Thus, there is no need for the fuel producers
to hold emission permits. This implies that the permit market cannot be used
by the fuel producers to gain any strategic advantages in the fuel market. Of
course, as already discussed, the fuel producers might be able to influence
the price of permits and thus the equilibrium of the fuel market through
their production decisions. But since all fuel producers will be symmetrically
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aﬀected, such actions have no strategic eﬀect.
Another novelty of our study is that we analyze the impact of coordinating
the supply of permits with the supply in output markets in an environmnet
where not only the permit market equilibrium aﬀects the output market, but
where also the output market equilibrium influences the price of emission
permits. As pointed out by Moe and Tangen (2000), it is not unreasonable
that the Russian authorities will allocate a substantial share of the country’s
emission permits to various commerical agents. They also argue that the
dominating Russian gas producer, Gazprom, may be left in control of a large
share of Russia’s permits. In this case, the supply of permits may be coordi-
nated with the supply of gas in order to maximize the total economic rent.
We show that such coordination may have important implications for the
equilibrium price of emission permits. We also demonstrate that coordina-
tion will have strategic eﬀects in the non-competitive fuel markets. Finally,
we show that although coordination implies that externalities between the
sellers of emission permits and fuel producers are internalised, coordination
might in some cases reduce rents, because coordination can lead to a strategic
disadvantage in non-competitive fuel markets.
The next section presents the basic model. There are two markets; a per-
mit market in which there is only one agent with market power and an out-
put market where competition is modelled as a symmetric Cournot duopoly.
This output market structure is intended to capture essential aspects of the
European gas market, where Russia is the dominating actor, with Norway
and Algeria as the two other major suppliers. Henceforth, we will therefore
think of the output market as the gas market, although the basic reasoning
probably would apply equally well to other non-competitive fuel markets,
such as the oil market. The model takes into account that natural gas is
sold in competition with other primary energy sources. Some of these, such
as oil and coal, cause larger emissions of greenhouse gases per energy unit
than does natural gas. Others, such as hydro and nuclear power, do not
cause greenhouse gas emissions at all. We demonstrate that both the nature
of the competition between natural gas and alternative fuels, as well as the
pollution intensity of alternative fuels will be of crucial importance for the
results.
Section 3 characterises a benchmark case with perfect competition in the
permit market along with oligopolistic gas market behaviour. The conse-
quences of market power in the permit market are then explored in Section
4 by letting one agent (Russia) be a monopoly supplier of emission permits,
maximizing the rent from permit sale. The standard monopoly pricing rule
applies. At the same time, profit maximizing gas producers are able to in-
fluence the permit price. The consequences for the gas market equilibrium
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are ambiguous, depending on the degree of substitution and on the relative
emission intensities between gas and alternative energy sources. In Section
5, we examine the case of coordination of gas market and permit market
policies. The standard monopoly pricing rule is then modified; it may even
be optimal to sell permits below marginal abatement costs. Coordination
will aﬀect Russia’s strategic position vis-a`-vis its competitors in the gas mar-
ket. Again, the degree of substitution and the relative emission intensities
vis-a`-vis alternative energy sources are crucial for the results.
Section 6 discusses whether or not it is profitable for Russia to coordinate
the supply of permits and the supply of gas. Since coordination in some cases
may weaken Russia’s strategic position in the gas market, it is not obvious
that coordination is profitable. Section 7 concludes.
2 The basic model
We model the European gas market as a symmetric Cournot duopoly. Two
producers, R (Russia) and N (Norway and Algeria), export their entire pro-
duction2 to a group of countries E (the European Union), which in our model
do not exercise any market power.3 Production quantities are denoted xRg
and xNg , respectively. Marginal costs of gas production are normalized to
zero.
Natural gas is sold in competition with other primary energy sources.
The inverse gas demand function is given by
pg = pg(xg, xa), (1)
where xg is gas consumption and xa is the consumption of alternative fuels,
and with the assumed properties ∂pg/∂xg < 0 and ∂pg/∂xa ≤ 0.
The inverse demand function of the alternative fuel is
pa = pa(xa, xg), (2)
with ∂pa/∂xa < 0 and ∂pa/∂xg ≤ 0.
2In practice, a substantial share of Russian gas production is for the domestic market.
To incorporate the domestic gas market in Russia would complicate the analysis. In
particular, we would need to take into account the eﬀect of changing gas prices on consumer
welfare in Russia. But since the domestic gas market in Russia is not well integrated
with the rest of the European gas market, it is not clear how this analysis should be
appropriately conducted. We therefore ignore this aspect.
3Historically, the imports of gas to the European Union has been managed by a few
large gas companies. The implementation of the gas market directive of the Euroepan
Commission will however imply a more competitive gas market structure.
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The consumption of one unit of gas causes eg units of greenhouse gas
emissions, while the emission factor of the alternative fuel is ea. Some of
the substitutes for natural gas, such as oil and coal, cause larger emissions
of greenhouse gases per energy unit than does natural gas. Others, such
as hydro and nuclear power, do not cause greenhouse gas emissions at all.
Therefore ea will be allowed to take on values both larger and smaller than
eg.
An international environmental agreement a` la the Kyoto Protocol defines
upper bounds on the emissions of greenhouse gases in each of the participat-
ing countries. We assume that emission permits are traded internationally
at the permit price q. A positive price of permits implies a downward shift
in the inverse demand function of fuels. Producers are then faced with the
following eﬀective inverse demand functions
pi(xi, xj)− eiq, i, j = a, g, i 6= j. (3)
The market for the alternative fuel is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
The equilibrium quantity is then found where the ”producer price” given by
(3) equals the marginal costs of production. We characterise the equilibrium
in the market for the alternative fuel in a reduced form as follows
xa = xa(xg, q). (4)
The equilibrium quantity of the alternative fuel xa will decline with the
gas volume xg because the fuels are substitutes (∂xa/∂xg ≤ 0). A higher
permit price will also reduce the quantity of the alternative fuel (for a given
level of xg) as long as the emission factor ea is positive (∂xa/∂q ≤ 0).
In the gas market, the equilibrium condition is given by
xRg + x
N
g = xg. (5)
The profit of the gas producer in country c, πcg, can now be defined as a
function of the gas production quantities and the price of emission permits
πcg(x
R
g , x
N
g , q) = (pg(xg, xa)− egq)xcg (6)
=
¡
pg(x
R
g + x
N
g , xa(x
R
g + x
N
g , q))− egq
¢
xcg, c = R,N.
Profit maximising behaviour will determine the equilibrium gas quantities as
a function of the permit price (xcg = x
c
g(q), c = R,N).
The price of emission permits q is determined by supply and demand in
the permit market. We assume that there is only one country (Russia) that
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can influence the permit price directly through permit trade. The demand
for emission permits faced by the Russian permit exporter can be divided
into two components. First, there is permit demand generated by gas con-
sumption and consumption of the alternative fuel (i.e., eaxa+egxg). Second,
there is the residual permit demand from all other emission sources in the
participating countries, represented by the demand function d(q). The resid-
ual permit demand is assumed to decline with the price of permits (dq < 0).
The net demand for emission permits faced by the Russian permit exporter
is then eaxa+ egxg + d(q)−Q, where Q is the total emission quota allocated
to the participating countries (except Russia).
Let y denote Russian export of emission permits. The Russian profit from
permit exports, πRp , is then
πRp (y) = qy − c(y), (7)
where c(y) represents the costs of generating y units of permits for export.
The shape of the cost function is determined by the initial emission quota
allocated to Russia and by the domestic abatement costs. Due to a high
initial allocation of quotas to Russia in the Kyoto Protocol, Russia may be
able to export a certain amount of permits at zero costs. Higher export levels
will require domestic abatement, though.
The equilibrium condition in the market for emission permits can now be
defined as
eaxa
¡
xRg + x
N
g , q
¢
+ eg(x
R
g + x
N
g ) + d(q)−Q = y. (8)
Eq. (8) defines the equilibrium permit price as a function of the total gas
consumption and the Russian supply of emission permits, q = q(xRg +x
N
g , y).
Without coordination of gas and permit market policies in Russia, the
optimal Russian supply of emission permits is found by maximisation of πRp
with respect to y, (see Eq. (7)) and the optimal Russian gas sales are found
by maximisation of πRg with respect to x
R
g (see Eq. (6)) Coordination implies
that both the gas seller and the permit seller in Russia take into account
the impacts on each others’ profits. In eﬀect, this implies that both agents
maximise the total profit for Russia, πR, given as
πR = πRp + π
R
g . (9)
Four variants of the model will be analyzed. In Section 3, we assume
that the permit market is competitive. Both gas sellers and permit sellers
then take the price of permits q as given. Sections 4 and 5 investigate the
impact of market power in the market for emission permits. Both gas sellers
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and permit sellers are then assumed to be able to influence the permit price.
The non-coordination case is discussed in Section 4, whereas coordination is
analyzed in Section 5.
Before we proceed, it will be useful to derive a few comparative static
results. Consider how the equilibrium permit price is aﬀected by changes in
the level of permit exports from Russia (y) and the level of gas production
and consumption (xcg) in our model. Assuming a stable equilibrium, we have
∂q
∂y
=
1
ea
∂xa
∂q
+ dq
< 0, (10)
∂q
∂xcg
= −
ea
∂xa
∂xig
+ eg
ea
∂xa
∂q
+ dq
R 0. (11)
We notice that while an increase in the supply of emission permits has a
negative impact on the permit price, the impact of higher gas production is
ambiguous. In particular, if the alternative fuel is more polluting than natural
gas (ea > eg) and at the same time is a close substitute for gas (∂xa/∂x
i
g
close to −1), higher gas production may cause a fall in the permit price. Of
course, the first order eﬀect of increased gas production and consumption is
a higher permit price, because the demand for permits increases. However,
when natural gas has a substitute which causes greenhouse gas emissions,
the direct eﬀect on emissions of increasing the gas sales (and thus reducing
the gas price) will be counteracted by substitution away from the alternative
fuel. If the alternative fuel is less polluting than natural gas, this substitution
eﬀect cannot outweigh the first order eﬀect on emission demand, and the
permit price is then bound to increase. If the fuels are perfect substitutes
(∂xa/∂x
i
g equal to minus one), total emissions will increase (decrease) as long
as natural gas is more (less) polluting than the alternative fuel. With less
than perfect substitutability, the alternative fuel must be significantly more
polluting than natural gas in order for total emissions and the permit price
to decline.
In order to put the analysis in perspective, let us compare the emission
factor of natural gas with some of its close substitutes. Coal, which is the
most polluting alternative to natural gas, has an emission factor of some
3.9 tonne carbon dioxide per tonne oil equivalent. The emission factor of
natural gas is about 2.34. Hence, if natural gas substitutes with coal only,
the reduction in coal consumption (measured in energy units) must be 0.6
or larger per unit of increased gas consumption in order to make the permit
price decline (i.e., ∂xa/∂xg < −0.6). In the case of substitution with oil only,
the degree of substitutability would have to be higher; the factor would then
increase to around 0.77.
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3 Perfect competition in the permit market
In order to establish a reference point, we solve the model for the case with
perfect competition in the permit market. Formally, this implies that all
agents take the permit price q as given. Assuming no coordination of gas
market and permit market policies in Russia, the first order conditions are
∂πRp
∂y
= q − c0 = 0, (12)
∂πRg
∂xRg
= pg − egq +
µ
∂pg
∂xg
+
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂xRg
¶
xRg = 0, (13)
∂πN
∂xNg
= pg − egq +
µ
∂pg
∂xg
+
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂xNg
¶
xNg = 0. (14)
The interpretations are straightforward: Eq. (12) states that with per-
fect competition in the permit market, the permit price equals marginal
abatement costs, and Eqs. (13) and (14) are simply the standard Cournot
conditions, including the cross-price eﬀect through substitution with the al-
ternative energy market.
We immediately realise that coordination of gas and permit market poli-
cies in Russia will have no impact on the equilibrium. As long as the permit
price is taken as given, the level of permit exports will have no impact on
the profits in the gas market, and gas market exports will have no impact on
the profit from permit sale.
Proposition 1 Coordination of gas and permit trade does not influence the
equilibrium if there is perfect competition in the permit market.
Proof. As long as q is regarded independent of y and xR, the payoﬀs
from gas export and quota export are independent, implying that ∂πR/∂y =
∂πRp /∂y and ∂π
R/∂xRg = ∂π
R
g /∂x
R
g . Hence, the first order conditions are
identical in the two cases.
4 Uncoordinated market power in the permit
market
Consider now the case where both the permit seller and gas sellers have
market power in the market for emission permits in the sense that they are
able to influence the price of emission permits. Of course, the fact that the
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permit exporter has market power in the permits market does not necessarily
imply that the gas sellers also have such market power. Even if the gas sellers
have market power in the gas market, the share of gas in total emissions may
be so low that they do not conceive of any market power in the permit
market. The opposite may also be the case; all agents in the permit market
may be too small to exert market power at the same time as there are a few
big producers of fossil fuels that exert substantial market power both in the
market for fossil fuels and in the market for permits.
Assuming that there is no coordination of gas and permit market policies,
the first order conditions are now
∂πRp
∂y
= q − c0 + ∂q
∂y
y = 0, (15)
∂πRg
∂xRg
= pg − egq +
µ
∂pg
∂xg
+
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂xRg
¶
xRg +
∂q
∂xRg
µ
−eg +
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
¶
xRg = 0,
(16)
∂πN
∂xNg
= pg − egq +
µ
∂pg
∂xg
+
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂xNg
¶
xNg +
∂q
∂xNg
µ
−eg +
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
¶
xNg = 0.
(17)
Consider first the eﬀect of market power on Russia’s export of emission
permits. Not surprisingly, Eq.(15) shows that the optimal permit export now
is given by the standard formula for a monopolist’s supply. For a given level
of gas sales (xRg and xNg ), the level of permit export is reduced in order to
raise the permit price and extract monopoly rents.
The eﬀect on the gas market equilibrium is more ambiguous. The presence
of market power in the permit market is captured by the last term on the
left hand side of Eqs. (16) and (17). The expression within the brackets,³
−eg + ∂pg∂xa
∂xa
∂q
´
, represents the eﬀect of increased price of emission permits
on the producer price of gas. The term −eg reflects the direct, negative
impact of a higher permit price on the producer price of gas. The other
term, ∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
, is an indirect, positive eﬀect on the producer price of gas via
substitution towards gas as the price of permits increases for the alternative
fuel. It turns out that the net eﬀect of these terms is ambiguous. Statement
(18) summarises the condition for a declining producer price of gas when the
permit price increases
∂(pg − egq)
∂q
= −eg +
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
< 0⇐⇒ eg
ea
>
∂pg/∂xa
∂pa/∂xa − c˜00
(18)
where c˜(xa) is the cost of producing the alternative fuel.
4 The producer price
4Equilibrium in the market for the alternative fuel is found where pa(xa, xg) − eaq =
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Figure 1: Eﬀect of market power on marginal profitability of gas production
of gas may rise if ea is high relative to eg and the cross-price eﬀect is strong,
because a higher price of permits will then create a strong substitution eﬀect
towards gas, which is the cleaner fuel.
According to Eq. (11), the eﬀect on the price of emission permits of
changes in gas output is also ambiguous (i.e., ∂q/∂xig Q 0). It follows from
Eq. (11) that ∂q/∂xig > 0 if and only if ea
∂xa
∂xig
+eg > 0. Statement (19) shows
the condition for a rising permit price as gas volumes increase5
∂q
∂xcg
> 0⇐⇒ eg
ea
>
∂pa/∂x
c
g
∂pa/∂xa − c˜00
c = R,N. (19)
A relatively high emission factor of the alternative fuel combined with a
strong cross-price eﬀect will imply that higher gas volumes cause a fall in the
price of permits. Higher gas consumption will then go together with a strong
fall in the consumption of the pollution-intensive alternative fuel, leading to
a fall in the total demand for permits.
What is then the total eﬀect of market power in the permit market on the
behaviour of the gas producers? It turns out that the degree of ambiguity
in the results may be reduced when we combine the expressions discussed
above. Define z ≡ 1/(∂pa/∂xa − c˜00). By combining the expressions in (18)
and (19), we find that the sign of the market power term (i.e., the last term
in Eqs. (16) and (17)), is determined as shown in Figure 1 (where i, j denote
a, g and i 6= j).
Proposition 2 For eg/ea /∈ [z∂pi/∂xj, z∂pj/∂xi] , i, j = a, g, i 6= j, gas
producers’ market power in the market for emission permits will reduce the
marginal profitability of gas production, inducing a fall in gas production
levels. Otherwise, gas production will tend to increase.
c˜0(xa). Implicit diﬀerentiation yields ∂xa/∂q = ea/(∂pa/∂xa− c˜00).
5Implicit diﬀerentiation of the equilibrium condition for the alternative fuel yields
∂xa/∂x
c
g = −∂pa/∂xcg/(∂pa/∂xa− c˜00).
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Proof. We consider the eﬀect of market power on xRg for a given level
of xNg and y. It follows from (18) and (19) that the last term in Eq. (16),
reflecting the existence of market power in the market for emission permits,
is negative when eg/ea /∈ [z∂pi/∂xj, z∂pj/∂xi] , i, j = a, g, i 6= j. The second
order condition (∂2πRg /∂(x
R
g )
2 < 0) implies that xRg must then decrease in
order to satisfy Eq. (16). It is easily seen that the opposite result is obtained
when eg/ea ∈ [z∂pi/∂xj, z∂pj/∂xi] , i, j = a, g, i 6= j.
The intuition is as follows: When eg/ea is suﬃciently small, implying
that gas substitutes with a relatively polluting energy source, increased gas
production will tend to drive the permit price down, because the increase in
gas consumption will replace the consumption of a more pollution-intensive
fuel. A lower price on permits will create a strong positive shift in the demand
for the alternative, pollution-intensive fuel and a corresponding negative shift
in gas demand. The producer price of gas may then decrease, despite the
fact that a reduction in the permit price has a direct positive impact on
the gas producer price. In sum, an increase in gas production reduces the
producer price of gas through adjustments in the permit price. Market power
in the permit market thus makes gas production less profitable at the margin,
calling for a reduction in the production level.
When eg/ea is suﬃciently large, completely opposite eﬀects are at work,
but the end result is nevertheless the same. Increased gas sale drives up the
price of emission permits, because gas is relatively pollution-intensive. A
higher permit price will tend to reduce the producer price of gas, because
the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect one. The reason is that the higher
price on permits only has a small impact on the price of the relatively clean
alternative fuel and therefore induces only a moderate substitution eﬀect
towards gas.
Hence, both with high and low values of eg/ea, market power in the
permit market tends to make gas production less profitable at the margin.
For intermediary values, however, the opposite may be the result.
Proposition 3 If ∂pa/∂xg = ∂pg/∂xa, gas producers’ market power in the
permit market will always induce reduced gas production.
This result states that if the demand functions for gas and the alternative
fuel are symmetric, market power in the permit market has an unambiguously
negative impact on the marginal profitability of gas production. In this case,
the relative pollution intensities are irrelevant for the conclusion.
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5 Coordination of market power
We have seen that coordination of gas market and permit market policies
makes no diﬀerence when the permit market is competitive. Turning to the
case of a non-competitive permit market, this conclusion will have to be
modified. When the agents are able to influence the price of permits, they
will also be able to influence each others’ profit. In eﬀect, an externality will
arise between the gas sellers and the permit seller. Since two of the agents
in our model are located within the same country, the government might
be interested in internalising the externality between the domestic agents in
order to achieve higher revenues for the economy as a whole. This might for
instance be achieved by organising the permit trade and the gas trade within
one organisation.
In this section, we explore the consequences for the permit and gas mar-
kets of such coordination. The next section analyses whether or not coordi-
nation will be a profitable way of organizing these activities.
The profit functions in the case of coordination are given by (9) for the
Russian agents and by (6) for the other gas producer. The first order condi-
tions are:
∂πR
∂y
= q − c0 + ∂q
∂y
y +
∂q
∂y
µ
−egxRg +
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
xRg
¶
= 0, (20)
∂πR
∂xRg
= pg − egq +
µ
∂pg
∂xg
+
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂xRg
¶
xRg +
∂q
∂xRg
µ
−egxRg +
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
xRg
¶
+
∂q
∂xRg
y = 0,
(21)
∂πN
∂xNg
= pg − egq +
µ
∂pg
∂xg
+
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂xNg
¶
xNg +
∂q
∂xNg
µ
−egxNg +
∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
xNg
¶
= 0.
(22)
By comparing Eqs. (20)-(22) with Eqs. (15)-(17), we realise that coor-
dination now implies a diﬀerent set of first order conditions for the Russian
gas and permit exporters. The new term in Eq. (20) reflects the marginal
eﬀect of permit exports y on gas profits, while the new term in Eq. (21)
refers to the marginal eﬀect of gas exports on permit export revenues. How-
ever, neither of these additional terms has unambiguous implications for the
marginal profitability of gas and permit exports.
Proposition 4 Coordination of gas and permit market policies may increase
or reduce the optimal markup on permits (q − c0). The optimal markup is
reduced if eg
ea
>
∂pg/∂xa
∂pa/∂xa−c˜00 and increases otherwise. With coordination, the
optimal markup on permits may be negative.
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Proof. It follows from (10) and (18) that the last term in Eq. (20)
is positive if eg
ea
>
∂pg/∂xa
∂pa/∂xa−c˜00 and negative otherwise. In order to prove
that the optimal markup may be negative (q < c0), assume that there is no
substitution with alternative fuels (∂pg/∂xa = 0). Then, we see from (20)
that q < c0 if y − egxRg < 0. It follows from the permit market equilibrium
condition (8) that egx
R
g (+ egx
N
g ) can be increased by any amount without
altering the equlibrium level of y, as long as this is met by a corresponding
increase in Q.
If a lower price on permits increases the producer price of gas (cf. (18)),
coordination will increase the marginal profitability of permit exports, be-
cause higher permit exports drive the permit price down and increase gas
profits. Hence, for a given level of xRg and x
N
g , the export of permits will in-
crease and the price of permits will be reduced relative to the non-coordination
case. This happens when the alternative fuel is not too pollution-intensive
and the degree of fuel substitution is weak. On the other hand, if the pro-
ducer price of gas increases with the permit price, coordination will make it
profitable to raise the markup over marginal abatement costs even further
than in the non-coordination case. Coordination of gas and permit market
policies thus has an ambiguous impact on the price of emission permits, de-
pending on relative pollution intensities of alternative energy sources and on
the degree of substitution.
With coordination of gas and permit market policies, it is no longer ob-
vious that market power in the permit market implies a rise in the permit
price relative to the case of a competitive permit market. By comparing Eqs.
(12) and (20), we realise that for a given level of xRg and x
N
g , the price of
permits may here be higher or lower than the competitive price, depending
on the sign of the term y − (eg − ∂pg∂xa
∂xa
∂q
)xRg . This term reflects the increase
in total income from gas and permit exports following a marginal increase in
the permit price. If gas export, measured in emission units (egx
R
g ), is large
relative to the permit export y, the optimal supply of permits may actually
be higher, and the price of permits may be lower, than with a competitive
permit market. If the cross-price eﬀect with the alternative fuel is not too
strong, a lower price on permits will then enhance gas incomes so strongly
that it more than outweighs the positive eﬀect of a high permit price on
permit income.
Consider next the conditions for the optimal level of gas sales (Eqs. (21)
and (22)). We realise that the first order conditions for the two gas producers
are no longer symmetric. The coordination of gas market and permit mar-
ket policies in Russia implies that the Russian gas producers will take into
account the impact on the permit sellers’ income. This is represented by the
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term y ∂q
∂xR in Eq. (21).
Proposition 5 Assume that y > 0. If increased supply of gas increases the
price of permits (∂q/∂xcg > 0), coordination of permit market and gas market
policies implies that the coordinating gas producer obtains a larger market
share. If increased supply of gas reduces the price of permits (∂q/∂xcg < 0),
the result is reversed.
Proof. Assume that xRg = x
N
g . Eqs. (21) and (22) show that this is
not an equilibrium unless y = 0. Define xNg so that Eq. (22) is satisfied.
Then, if y > 0, the expression in Eq. (21) will be greater than zero as long
as xRg = x
N
g and
∂q
∂xRg
> 0. From the second order condition we have that
∂2πR/∂
¡
xRg
¢2
< 0. Hence, an equilibrium requires that xRg > x
N
g . It follows
straightforwardly that the converse is true when ∂q
∂xRg
< 0.
Ceteres paribus, a net exporter of emission permits benefits from higher
permit prices. If increased supply of gas leads to a higher permit price
(∂q/∂xcg > 0), coordination of gas and permit market policies will therefore
increase the marginal profitability of gas exports. In eﬀect, Russia becomes
a more aggressive competitor in the gas market, increasing its market share.
In this case, coordination creates a strategic advantage for the Russian gas
exporter.
If, on the other hand, increased gas supply causes a fall in the permit
price (∂q/∂xcg < 0), the coordination of permit and gas market policies in
Russia will make Russia a less aggressive competitor in the gas market, and
its market share will fall. Coordination thus creates a strategic disadvantage.
Some further insight into the optimal strategies in the case of coordination
can be obtained by solving Eqs. (20)-(21). By utilising Eqs. (10) and (11),
we obtain
−1
ea
∂xa
∂xcg
+ eg
(pg − egq +
dpg
dxRg
xRg ) = q − c0, (23)
pg − egc0 +
dpg
dxRg
xRg − ea
∂xa
∂xcg
∂q
∂y
Φ = 0, (24)
where dpg
dxRg
≡ ∂pg
∂xg
+ ∂pg
∂xa
∂xa
∂xRg
and Φ ≡ y − (eg − ∂pg∂xa
∂xa
∂q
)xRg . The interpretation
of Eq. (23) is that on the margin, the costs of exercising market power
in the permit market from the demand side (i.e., via xRg ) should equal the
costs of exercising market power from the supply side (i.e., via y). To aﬀect
the permit price through reduced y has a cost of q − c0 per unit (i.e., the
margin in the permit market). On the demand side, xRg must increase by
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1/(ea
∂xa
∂xcg
+ eg) units in order to increase permit demand by one unit, and the
unit cost of increased xRg is reflected by the marginal profit in the gas market
−(pg − egq + dpgdxRg x
R
g ).
Eq. (24) has an interesting interpretation. Consider the case with no
substitution between gas and alternative fuels (i.e., ∂xa
∂xcg
= 0). Then Eq. (24)
says that a profit maximising, coordinating gas producer should completely
ignore the impact of gas supply on the permit price, provided the gas pro-
ducer is subsidized so that the producer price of gas reflects the real social
costs of permits c0 rather than the monopoly price q.6 In eﬀect, the gas seller
should then behave as if the permit market were competitive (taking the
level of y as given). Things become somewhat more complicated when gas
substitutes with another polluting energy source, though. Then, the gas sup-
plier must also take into consideration the eﬀect of changes in gas supply on
total gas and permit profits via changes in the equilibrium consumption of
the alternative fuel.
6 Is coordination profitable?
The positive analysis of the eﬀects of coordination of gas and permit market
policies can make Russia either a more or a less aggressive competitor in
the gas market, depending on the sign of ∂q/∂xcg. Such strategic eﬀects will
shift profits among the gas suppliers (as well as aﬀecting total profits in the
gas market). Hence, coordination is more than a mere internalisation of
pecuniary externalities among the Russian gas and permit exporters. While
the pure internalisation of pecuniary externalities will clearly be profitable,
the profit eﬀects of changing the rule of the game in the gas market are less
obvious. In this section, we first discuss why the strategic eﬀect may either
reduce or enhance the profits of the Russian gas supplier. We then show
that the reduction in profits may be strong enough to make coordination
unprofitable.
It is well known that in the Cournot game, each of the agents could in-
crease his profit if he could credibly announce a marginally higher quantity
than the Cournot equilibrium quantity. The marginal profit of an increase in
the pre-announced quantity will be positive until the Stackelberg equilibrium
quantity is reached. Beyond this point, marginal profits of a further expan-
sion of supply will be negative (e.g., Varian (1992)). Any action that alters a
firm’s marginal costs of production will credibly change the optimal output
6The required subsidy s per unit of gas production is given by pg− egq+ s = pg− egc0,
implying that s = eg(q − c0).
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level. If the action reduces marginal costs, the firm’s output increases (for
any given level of the other firms’ output). In the Cournot game, a higher
output from one of the firms yields lower output from the other firms, which
again has a positive impact on the profit of the firm that initially increased its
output. An action is said to have a positive strategic eﬀect if the other firms’
responses to the action increase the profit of the firm taking the action. If,
on the other hand, the other firms’ responses decrease the firm’s profit, the
action is said to have a negative strategic eﬀect (e.g., Tirole (1988), chapter
8). In addition to the strategic eﬀect, an action has also a direct eﬀect on the
profit of the firm taking the action. This direct eﬀect captures the impact
on the profit for a given output by the other firms. The action is profitable
as long as the sum of the direct and strategic profit eﬀects is positive.
In our model, the direct eﬀect on profits of coordinating gas and permit
exports is clearly postive, since coordination will internalise the externalities
between gas producers and permit suppliers. (We ignore any extra costs
associated with the administration of a coordination policy). There is also
a strategic eﬀect, since coordination in our model will alter the coordinating
gas producers’ marginal costs of production. However, the strategic eﬀect
contributes positively to profits if and only if the coordination policy makes
Russia a more aggressive gas supplier.
Proposition 6 Assume that y > 0. The strategic eﬀect then contributes
negatively (positively) to Russia’s profit from gas production if increased gas
supply reduces (increases) the price of permits (∂q/∂xRg < 0 (∂q/∂x
R
g > 0)).
Proof. When y∂q/∂xRg < 0, it follows from Eq. (21) and the second
order condition (∂2πR/∂
¡
xRg
¢2
< 0) that the coordination policy will imply
a reduction in xRg for a given level of y and x
N
g . It then follows from standard
results in the literature that the strategic eﬀect is negative. The opposite
result is obtained when y∂q/∂xRg > 0.
When increased gas supply decreases the price of permits, coordination of
gas and permit market policies will make Russia a less aggressive competitor
in the gas market. Since a higher permit price increases permit revenues, co-
ordination will increase the Russian gas supplier’s marginal cost and therefore
decrease the optimal xRg (for given levels of y and x
N
g ). In this case, coordi-
nation will have a negative strategic eﬀect on Russia’s profit. The opposite
result is obtained if increased gas supply increases the permit price.
Proposition 7 Assume that y > 0. The coordination policy is profitable if
increased gas supply increases the price of permits (∂q/∂xRg > 0).
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Proof. The coordination policy is profitable if the sum of the strategic
eﬀect and the direct eﬀect is positive. If ∂q/∂xRg > 0, the strategic eﬀect
is positive (see proof of previous proposition).The direct eﬀect equals the
benefit of internalising the externality between the Russian gas and permit
exporters, which is clearly non-negative.
If increased production of gas leads to a higher permit price, coordina-
tion implies lower marginal production cost in the gas market and hence an
increase in gas production. This will increase Russia’s total profit for two
reasons. First, Russia gains a larger market share in the gas market, which
increases its profit in the gas market. Second, the coordinating policy has
optimally internalised the externalities in the two markets.
Our next question is whether a negative strategic eﬀect may reduce prof-
its so much that it more than outweighs the benefits of internalising the
externality between the Russian gas and permit exporters and thus makes
coordination unprofitable.
Proposition 8 Coordination of gas and permit market policies might be un-
profitable if the strategic eﬀect is negative.
Proof. An example will suﬃce. Let the direct demand functions for gas
and alternative energy be
xi(pi, pj) = 1500− pi + bpj, i, j = a, g, i 6= j, (25)
implying the indirect demand functions
pi(xi, xj) =
1
1− b2 [(1 + b) 1500− xi − bxj] , i, j = a, g, i 6= j, (26)
Let eg = 0.5, d(q) = 0, c(y) = .5y
2, and c˜(xa) = .005x
2
a. By using Eq. (35) it
can then be shown that
∂q
∂xcg
=
.5− bea
e2a (1− b2)
(27)
Assuming that b ∈ [0, 1] , Eqs. (27) and (21) show that coordination will put
Russia at a strategic disadvantage when bea > 0.5, implying that ea > 0.5.
Assume that ea = 0.6. Let s denote the emission constraint expressed as the
share of the baseline emission level (s ∈ [0, 1i). We now calculate the profit
gain from coordination for diﬀerent levels of b and s. The results are shown
in Figure 2.
When ea = 0.6, coordination creates a strategic disadvantage if b > 0.833
(see Eq. (27)). We find that coordination will reduce profits for b > 0.836.
If ea is raised to .8, a strategic disadvantage is created for b > 0.625. In
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Figure 2: Coordination may be unprofitable
this case, coordination will reduce profits for b > 0.629. If both cases, the
threshold level b is independent of s.7
Besides demonstrating that coordination may be unprofitable, these sim-
ulation results also demonstrate the crucial importance for the profitability
of coordination of the degree of substitution with alternative fuels and of
the pollution intensity of these fuels. In general, a high degree of substitu-
tion with a highly polluting substitute tends to reduce the profitability of
coordination, because the price of permits then tends to fall as gas supply is
enhanced.
7 Concluding remarks
We have demonstrated that the impact of monopoly power in the permit
market may have an ambiguous impact on the price of permits once we take
into account that permit exporters may also be involved on the seller side of
non-competitive fuel markets. Hence, it is not obvious that Russia’s potential
market power in the market for greenhouse gas emission permits will increase
the equilibrium permit price.
We have also shown that coordination of supply decisions in fuel markets
and in the market for permits will have strategic impacts in non-competitive
fuel markets. Whether or not the strategic eﬀect is positive for the coor-
7Simulation details are available upon request.
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dinating agent depends on how increased output of fuels aﬀects the price
of permits, which again depends on the substitution possibilities between
alternative fuels and on the relative emission intensities.
Coordination is always profitable if the strategic eﬀect is positive, but may
be unprofitable otherwise. A negative strategic eﬀect may reduce profits
by more than the increase in profits caused by the internalisation of the
externalities between fuel and permit suppliers.
Whether or not Russia’s export of greenhouse gas emission permits will
actually be coordinated with the export of fossil fuels depends both on the
profitability of such coordination and on the possibilities of practical im-
plementation. The latter issue is primarily a question about political will,
because there are few practical diﬃculties with allocating all emission permits
in Russia to the leading fuel producers (e.g., Gazprom). Such an allocation
would make it quite likely that coordination will actually take place.
To assess the profitability of coordination would require empirical investi-
gations beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is of interest to note
that the expected export of emission permits from Russia following the im-
plementation of the Kyoto Protocol has the same order of magnitude as the
Russian export of natural gas (measured in CO2 equivalents). This suggests
that considerations about the impact on fuel prices will be of considerable
importance for the decisions about the level of permit exports. It is also
worth noting that it seems likely that increased supply of Russian natural
gas might reduce the price of emission permits, because much of this gas
probably will replace pollution-intensive coal in European power stations. If
the price of permits declines with Russian gas exports, coordination of gas
and permit supply will put Russia at a strategic disadvantage in the gas
market. That coordination may be unprofitable therefore seems to be more
than a theoretical possibility.
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